Privatisation by Stevens, Jim
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Stevens, Jim (1984) Privatisation. Quarterly Economic Commentary, 10 
(1). pp. 66-68. ISSN 0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/51653/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
Economic Perspective 3 
PRIVATISATION 
Jim Stevens 
Department of Economics 
University of Strathdyde 
For many p o l i t i c i a n s and academic 
c o m m e n t a t o r s p r i v a t i s a t i o n has 
implications reaching far beyond the mere 
t r a n s f e r of ownership. Conservative 
governments have in the past introduced 
denationalisat ion programmes although 
never on the present grand scale. As 
Simpson (1984) and others have pointed 
out, the Government and i t s supporters 
often f a i l to dis t inguish between the 
effects of d e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and the 
benefits of liberalisation. 
I t i s a widely held view that nationalised 
industries are less efficient than private 
companies. Although Heald & Steel (1982) 
are doubtful about t h i s proposition the 
e s s e n c e of t h e i r argument can be 
summarised as f o l l o w s : " p u b l i c 
e n t e r p r i s e s are i n t r i n s i c a l l y l e s s 
efficient than private enterprises because 
they are insulated from the disciplines of 
the capi ta l and product markets" (p.339). 
I t i s at th i s point that the d is t inc t ion 
b e t w e e n l i b e r a l i s a t i o n and 
denationalisation must be drawn. 
Liberalisation involves the curtailment or 
abolition of statutory monopoly power with 
consequent increases in both al locat ive 
and product ive e f f i c i ency . No such 
benefits derive from the transfer of 
o w n e r s h i p and t h e g a i n s from 
l i be ra l i s a t i on could be obtained without 
a s se t s a l e s . In s i t u a t i o n s where a 
c o m p e t i t i v e environment cannot be 
guaranteed or where wider policy concerns 
dictate the need to intervene to alter the 
market outcome the re i s a view t h a t 
efficiency gains accrue from a policy of 
denationalisat ion. I t i s argued that 
actual or potential interference in the 
af fa i rs of business leads to actual or 
potential sources of economic inefficiency. 
Thus regula ted and subs id i sed p r i v a t e 
concerns are to be preferred to state owned 
operations because government will interfere 
to a greater than necessary extent with the 
l a t t e r . Where the s t a t e i s the owner i t i s 
asserted that inefficiency will be tolerated 
to avoid the po l i t i ca l consequences of the 
bus iness going bankrupt . Whils t the 
e x i s t e n c e of t h i s problem i s pure 
conjecture, Steel (1984) points out that any 
such ine f f i c i ency from t h i s source i s 
unlikely to be eliminated via the present 
policy of creating par t state-part private 
"hybrid companies". 
The Government have decided to maintain 
large share holdings because s t r a t e g i c 
concerns dictate that certain eventualities 
must be effectively precluded. In addition 
they feel confident that they wil l be able 
to leave the "hybrid" to determine i t s own 
commercial policy in a l l but a few respects. 
If such restraint i s possible for partially 
denationalised companies i t ought to be 
equally possible for wholly owned s ta te 
corporations. If state ownership per se is 
indeed a source of actual or potent ial 
inefficiency i t i s not an argument which the 
government should marshall to defend present 
policies. 
I t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t , s i n c e 
denationalisation reduces the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement, i t will help secure 
the Government's f i n a n c i a l pol icy of 
encouraging lower in teres t rates and hence 
stimulating investment led growth. Asset 
sales provide a once and for al l gain to the 
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Exchequer as well as a future stream of 
reductions in the PSBR consequent on 
removing nationalised industry borrowings. 
This la t te r effect i s simply a transfer of 
demand and has no i m p l i c a t i o n s for 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s . The gains from a 
sustained programme of denationalisation 
are l ike ly to be small and temporary. 
Asset sales postpone the requirement for 
government to confront the fact that the 
British public simultaneously expect high 
public expenditure and lower tax burdens. 
This i s a real danger that national assets 
w i l l be sold off t o f inance publ ic 
consumption and to temporarily perpetuate 
the myth that an e f f ic ien t sophisticated 
welfare s t a t e can be sustained without 
sacrifices of personal disposable income. 
Thus, although asset sales may provide a 
modicum of short-run r e l i e f and benefi t , 
t h e government canno t e scape t he 
implications of i t s underlying f i sca l 
stance. The requirement to establish some 
concensus on public spending remains. A 
programme of denationalisation has limited 
short-run effects and v i r tua l ly no long-
run implications for the conduct of macro-
economic policy. 
I t has been asserted tha t denational-
isa t ion wi l l cu r t a i l the power of public 
sector unions and thus reduce the source 
of f r i c t ion in labour markets and allow 
government macro-economic policy to 
operate more e f f i c i e n t l y . Any r e n t s 
accruing to organised labour do not 
emanate from public ownership but from X-
ine f f i c i ency sus t a ined by lack of 
c o m p e t i t i o n in p r o d u c t m a r k e t s . 
Liberal isat ion and not denationalisation 
provides the key t o address ing such 
issues. 
Wider share ownership i s frequently cited 
as a reason for favouring denational-
isat ion. Government spokesmen refer to 
vague notions of encouraging "real public 
ownership" and "ownership by the people". 
The government wishes to use asset sales 
to encourage the return of the small 
investor to the London Stock Exchange. 
Since the mid 1950s the personal sector 
has been a net s e l l e r of co rpora te 
securities. In 1981 the percentage of UK 
e q u i t i e s accounted for by p r i v a t e 
shareholders was 28.2% whilst f inancial 
i n s t i t u t i ons accounted for 57.9%. The 
reason for this decline rests with the UK 
fiscal system which res t r ic t s the ability 
of individuals to buy and hold shares and 
encourages indi rec t investment through 
pension schemes and insurance l inked 
savings. The evidence from the flotations 
of B r i t i s h Aerospace and Amersham 
International suggests that the or ig inal ly 
high number of individual shareholdings has 
f a l l e n markedly i m p l y i n g t h a t an 
overwhelming proportion of the stock has 
ended up in the hands of i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
investors . Renational-isation of s t a t e 
industries s t i l l does not make i t efficient 
for small investors to participate directly 
in equity markets. The argument that asset 
sales in themselves promote wider share 
ownership is particularly unconvincing. 
The b e n e f i t s of p r i v a t i s a t i o n ' der ive 
l a r g e l y , i f not e x c l u s i v e l y , from 
l i be r a l i s a t i on . However, denationalisation 
imposes clear costs on the British taxpayer. 
The London new issue market i s imperfect and 
t h e r e i s a sy s t ema t i c tendency for 
mispricing. The Government have chosen the 
'offer for sa le ' route in the majority of 
previous flotations. In this avenue, there 
i s a clear source of pressure on the company 
and i t s advisors to se t a low price. This 
heightens the possibility of the issue being 
oversubscribed which generates favourable 
publici ty for a l l concerned, protects the 
u n d e r w r i t e r s and ensures an immediate 
capi ta l gain for those successful in the 
b a l l o t s . Things can and do go wrong 
especially given unstable markets or the 
release of unfavourable news between drawing 
up the p r o s p e c t u s and r e c e i v i n g 
a p p l i c a t i o n s . The a l l - p a r t y Selec t 
Committee of Publ ic Acounts has been 
extremely c r i t i c a l of th i s aspect of asset 
s a l e s and has r i g h t l y pointed out the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s involved in securing a f a i r 
price using th i s approach. There i s also 
considerable public concern about the fees 
and commissions accruing to those involved 
in the process of marketing the equity. The 
Treasury estimate that a handful of c i ty 
institutions have received £22.7 million for 
services rendered during six of the early 
f lo ta t ions . Given high transactions costs 
and a s ignif icant probabil i ty of under 
pricing there are grounds for questioning 
whether the taxpaying public has received a 
fa i r price from the sale of i t s asse ts so 
far. 
Asset sales provide l i t t l e clear economic 
b e n e f i t s t o the government although 
p o l i t i c a l advantage may well accrue. 
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Public enterprise i s unpopular with a 
broad cross-section of the public and 
promises to " rol l back the f ront iers of 
t he S t a t e " c o n s e q u e n t l y a t t r a c t 
cons iderab le e l e c t o r a l support. In 
addition, denationalisat ion affords the 
Conservatives the prospect of offering 
their natural supporters both income and 
investment opportunit ies. A policy of 
l i be ra l i s a t ion i s a different matter. 
Liberalisation will eliminate the monopoly 
rents accruing to the business and the 
agents within the business. These will be 
redistributed in favour of consumers. If 
a significant proportion of the expected 
earnings of a company consists of monopoly 
r e n t s t h e n l i b e r a l i s a t i o n w i l l 
substantially reduce the receipts from any 
s u b s e q u e n t s a l e . A p o l i c y of 
liberalisation is in direct conflict with 
a pol icy of reducing the borrowing 
requirement through asset sales. 
With regard to British Telecom and British 
Airways, these are more than esoter ic 
points. There has already been criticism 
of the government owing to the l imited 
extent of the competition which has been 
sanctioned in the te lecommunicat ions 
industry and the undue haste with which 
the regulatory arrangements have been 
designed. Airl ines operate in a highly 
regulated environment where monopoly rents 
are high and over which the UK government 
has very l i t t l e control . The sale of BA 
as presently structured would be the 
transfer of a monopoly from the public to 
the private sector. There is concern that 
these measures wi l l yield insuff ic ient 
relief to consumers but generate handsome 
receipts to sat isfy the so-called 'PSBR 
imperative'. 
I t i s c l ea r t h a t t he r e has been a 
conscious government decision to emphasise 
the ga ins from l i b e r a l i s a t i o n as a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for p r i v a t i s a t i o n . 
Government spokesmen now argue that the 
revenue i m p l i c a t i o n s and other s ide 
effects are of secondary importance. The 
experience of the BT exercise provides 
ground for doubting t h i s . I t appears 
t h a t the prospec ts of in t roducing 
compet i t ion i n to the a i r t r a n s p o r t 
industry are l imited in the medium term. 
An early denationalisation of Bri t ish 
Airways in i t s present form would 
t h e r e f o r e l e a v e the gove rnmen t ' s 
c r e d i b i l i t y and commitment to a 
competitive market economy in ta t ters . 
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